Authentication is the first step toward establishing a service provider and customer (C-P) association. In a mobile network environment, a lightweight and secure authentication protocol is one of the most significant factors to enhance the degree of service persistence. This work presents a secure and lightweight keying and authentication protocol suite termed TAP (TimeAssisted Authentication Protocol). TAP improves the security of protocols with the assistance of time-based encryption keys and scales down the authentication complexity by issuing a reauthentication ticket. While moving across the network, a mobile customer node sends a reauthentication ticket to establish new sessions with service-providing nodes. Consequently, this reduces the communication and computational complexity of the authentication process. In the keying protocol suite, a key distributor controls the key generation arguments and time factors, while other participants independently generate a keychain based on key generation arguments. We undertake a rigorous security analysis and prove the security strength of TAP using CSP and rank function analysis.
I. Introduction
Newly emerging technologies such as IoT devices, smartphones with various sensors, wireless power charging systems, wearable devices, and smart sensors have brought forth different services with new types of service provider and customer (P-C) association requirements. For any service provider and customer (P-C) association, authentication is the first step. Typically, customers seek to obtain services from an authenticated service provider, and service providers are concerned about providing services to verified customers. However, to provide seamless service in a mobile environment, the service provider entity should be able to authenticate the mobile customer node with only a minimum delay time. This implies that the message exchange complexity of the authentication process should be low. A suitable authentication protocol for such an application should be lightweight and yet should ensure a proper protocol security level. Moreover, a secure authentication protocol certifies that the communicating entity is an authorized entity which is alive and participating in a protocol run according to a defined role. Further, the protocol run follows the correct pre-set sequence of a protocol run, and this should be achieved over insecure communication channels between the service provider and customer nodes [1] [2] .
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Various authentication protocols have been designed to meet the requirements of different applications, including authentication for sensor networks [3] , authentication for streaming data [4] , authentication for IoT solutions [5] , and authentication for ad-hoc networks [6] . The protocols developed thus far can be categories into the three primary categories of passwordbased authentication [7] [8] , certificate-based authentication [9] [10] , and signature-based authentication protocols [11] . In this study, we introduce a novel, lightweight, and secure timeassisted authentication protocol suite termed TAP [12] . The TAP protocol suite consists of keying and authentication protocol suites. The keying protocol suite consists of key agreement and key retrieval protocols. Likewise, the authentication protocol consists of the three protocols of the initial authentication protocol, re-authentication protocol 1, and re-authentication protocol 2. The initial authentication protocol is a password-based authentication protocol, whereas the reauthentication protocols are certificate-based authentication protocols where the certificate is a time-based ticket issued for a specified time duration. The well-known authentication protocol Kerberos [13] also employs a ticket for authentication, though in contrast with Kerberos, TAP does not require time synchronization. Moreover, in TAP the ticket verifier can authenticate the customer by itself without contacting the ticket-granting entity. Moreover, a stolen ticket in TAP is of no significance, while in the case of Kerberos, an unexpired stolen ticket is useful for an intruder. In an earlier study [14] , the author analyzed the Kerberos protocol using CSP (communicating sequential processes) and a rank function analysis and established that the protocol is vulnerable to few known attacks, whereas our CSP and rank function analysis show that TAP is an entirely secure protocol. To ensure secure authentication, TAP employs a distributed keychain generation mechanism and reverses the time-based usage of the keychain. Unlike TESLA [15] , in TAP the keychain is independently generated by multiple devices and is also used by each device to drive other encryption keys. For instance, during an interval when a customer node wants to obtain service, it acquires an authentication ticket encrypted with the ℎ key, and once it moves across the network, the verifier can verify the ticket by decrypting the ticket using the ℎ key. The key distribution and time-based usage of the keychain are controlled by the main authentication entity (ME), which can be an independent authentication server or an agent installed on a server. While moving across the network, a mobile customer experiences the authentication process multiple times. With authentication ticket, the overall computational and message exchange complexity of the authentication process is reduced significantly. To establish the overall infrastructure for service and authentication, each main authentication entity (ME) creates a group of service provider entities and neighboring main authentication entities (ME). Using group key encryption, the main authentication entity (ME) broadcasts the time-based key generation parameters to all group members. In earlier work [16] , the author presented and examined several group key management protocols. In this discussion, we assume that the main authentication entity (ME) has knowledge of the public keys of all group members; hence, it can share a group key with new group members using public-private key semantics. To determine the security strength of TAP, we considered an intruder as discussed in earlier work
II. Analytical Model and Proposed Scheme
The TAP system is not limited to a particular network type or application; it is suitable for sensor networks, mobile networks, and client-server applications, among others. For the discussion and analysis, we consider that the TAP system consists of the three major entities of the main authentication entity ( ), the service provider entity ( ), and the customer node ( ). The main authentication entity ( ) knows the public keys of all service provider entities ( ) and customer nodes ( ). It authenticates and issues a time-based ticket ( ) for re-authentication. It also authenticates any newly joining service provider entity ( ). During the authentication process of , the sends the customer node's requirement profile for an efficient and optimized P ↔ C relationship. In addition, the controls the key distribution and derives various keys from the keychain. All MEs are connected via secure links and share public keys with all of their neighbors. The service provider entity ( ) authenticates upon receiving a valid authentication ticket ( ) and starts providing services based upon the user profile. Upon the receipt of the initial authentication request, forwards the message to . In some applications, has two separate areas of operation: the service-delivery area ( ) and the communication area ( ). may authenticate or forward a request to while is in , and it may provide services once it enters . The customer node ( ) can join or leave the system dynamically and can move across the network. Either joins the network or switches from one service provider ( ) to another. In both cases, is responsible for initiating the authentication procedure.
Notations:
• = The ℎ main authentication entity. • = The ℎ service provider entity.
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• =Group of all associated entities of ℎ ME. • = Group of all non-associated entities of ℎ ME who knows the . • 0 =The time-based key generated at 0 ℎ interval known as commitment key.
• =The time-based key generated at ℎ interval by . • = The secret public key of ℎ Customer, it is publically known to the s only.
• is the public key of , is the public key of and is the public key of .
• =A group key generated by . • = A C→P session key generated at ℎ interval. • = A partial key of used to generate → session key.
• , = A C→C session key generated from partial keys. The overall system architecture is shown in Figure 1 . Each creates a group which consists of neighbor s and associated service provider entities. The shares a symmetric group key with all group members. For instance, in Figure 1 2 creates a group consisting of 1 , can share group key with new group members using public-private key encryption. The group key is a rational choice given the assumption that group members are not synchronized with regard to time. In a stable synchronized distributed system, the group key can be replaced by the time-based key , where should be the final key in the keychain. The TAP scheme consists of two protocol suites, the keying protocol suite and the authentication protocol suite, which are discussed below in subsections A and B, respectively B. Keying Protocol: As in TESLA [15] , TAP also generates a keychain using an irreversible function. However, in TESLA keys are used to authenticate a broadcasting entity; in TAP the keys are used to derive several other keys, such as a ticket encryption key, a C↔P session key, and partial session key generators which provide security to the authentication system overall. Moreover, in TESLA [15] , the keychain is generated in the broadcasting entity, whereas in TAP all members of generate and share the same "chain of key generators" of length . The group leader ( ) shares the key generation information ( ) with group members when they join the group. After the expiration of (at a valid time for commitment key) broadcast to all members of ; is encrypted with or in the case of a time-synchronized system is encrypted with (the final key in the keychain). The key generation information ( ) is used to generate a commitment key ( 0 ); afterward, all group members independently generate the "chain of key generators." The group leader controls the procedure of commitment key generation and all related characteristics.
The key generation information = ( , ) || || || 0 || || consists of several pieces of information. and are index and offset values, respectively, which are used to select a predefined value from the secret . is the valid time duration for commitment key 0 , is the time on when it was broadcasting , is a nonce and is the key retrieval mode (discussed in subsection b). Note that is divided into number of intervals; it also determines the keychain length. a) Key Generation and Distribution: The time frame shown in Figure 3 -(a) is composed of three periods: the time required for key generation ( ), the time needed for key distribution ( ), and the valid time for the commitment key ( ). All members follow the subsequent steps: (1) run a function (shown in Figure 3 corresponds to the ℎ interval, the key is retrieved as ( 0 ) = ⇒ ( ) = ( , ) .
(4) broadcasts for the next chain to all group members using or . Steps 1-3 are performed in and step 4 is executed during . In addition to the time-based keys (for ticket encryption), also generates a unique C↔P session key = ( || ( )) for verified and . Moreover, the validity time for is given as = − . b) The Retrieval Modes For The Ticket Encryption Key: The authentication ticket consists of two segments: the customer information segment and the key retrieval information segment respectively encrypted with the time-based key and group key . The key retrieval procedure depends on the structure of the ticket, which is determined by the system requirements and constraints. We propose three different key retrieval modes, as presented below.
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The second half of depends on the mode and consists of time-based key retrieval information; once the time-based key is retrieved, it is then employed to decrypt and verify the first half of .
In mode-01, adds the index value ( ) in the key retrieval information segment. The ticket verifier compares the appended value within the locally generated vector ( ). A match at the ℎ place indicates that the ticket is generated by at the ℎ interval and can be decrypted by key . In mode-02, inserts the ticket issuing time into the key retrieval information segment. The verifiers can search for the value of the index within the following range:
Where, is the current time of the verifier clock and is the time drift. Initially, the value of is calculated as 0 = | − | .
Upon each successful retrieval of , the value of is updated as shown below. In mode-03, all members independently generate a binary hash tree whose leaf nodes are 'indexing values' taken from index vector ( ). adds the index value ( ) and log 2 | | number of hash values in key retrieval information segment; these hash values are selected nodes of the hash tree. Likewise, the verifier can reconstruct the hash tree with the total log 2 | | number of hash operations, which gives the complexity of ( ). After the reconstruction of the tree and confirmation of the head node, the verifier retrieves the index value by running the following simple search algorithm. Owing to the appended hash values, the index search complexity is reduced to O (1).
Search algorithm:
 Start from head node and go down  Ignore the appended values and follow reconstructed node.  Do until level log 2 | | − 1  Now, finally select the appended value which is the index value The mode 3 is suitable if the keychain is very long.
C. Authentication Protocol Suite:
A customer node is authenticated in three different ways. When it joins the system, it goes through a password-based authentication procedure termed the initial authentication protocol. Hereafter, when moves across the network, it is re-authenticated by a certificate-based authentication procedure known as a re-authentication protocol, where a certificate is a timebased ticket issued by during the initial authentication protocol run.
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M2.
In the joining request sends 0 encrypted with 's public key to . If is already registered with , the nonce 0 can be replaced with the hash value of the password. M3.
forwards the request to . retrieves the profile from the database;
if is authorized for the requested services, retrieves 's secret key and sends the message M4.
M4.
sends M4 to composed of ticket , the index value, and 1 (challenge for ) all encrypted with intended for and 0 = ( || 0 + 1 || 1 || || || ) intended for . retrieves the customer profile and session key from the ticket .
M5
. forwards 0 to . After challenge verification, accepts . a.
→ : 0 || ∴ if the service provider entity cannot fulfill the service requested due to resource limitations, it sends a message 'Limited'. may continue or connect to another service provider entity with the allotted ticket. M6.
After challenge confirmation, starts providing services; otherwise, halts the service and announces as an invalid ticket. b) Re-Authentication Protocol-1: When an authenticated moves from → such that { , } ∈ , the protocol proceeds as follows.
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1-If { , }∆ , the respective service provider entity ( ) decrypts the messages and retrieves the partial keys for associated customers; sends the partial key along with a challenge response to and . After challenge verification, both and generate a C↔C session key , = ( ⨁ 1 || ⨁ 0 ) for further communication.
2-If { , } ∈ and ∆ and ∆ , the respective service provider entities decrypt the message and retrieve the partial key for associated customers. and send the partial key along with a challenge response to and , respectively. After the challenge 
b.
→ : ( || 0 || 0 ′ )|| || ℎ . For re-authentication protocol-2, if does not obtain a response for a switch request, it indicates that an intruder has forged ( ), and is unable to proceed. Hence, ignores the request and sends an initial authentication request along with nonce sent in the previous request. The inclusion of the previous nonce prevents the situation of misunderstanding between a lost request and a replay attack.. a. → :
This
III. Strength against several known attacks
To verify the security of TAP, we introduce an intruder into the system, as discussed in earlier work [17] . The intruder is capable of controlling all communication channels (send and receive); it can redirect, spoof, replay or block messages and has initially known information, such as the IDs of all users. In the presence of such an intruder, we explore the strength of TAP against certain known attacks, in this case the replay, parallel session, and binding attacks.
A. Impersonating
Similarly, even if ( ) impersonates and successfully intercepts all messages from , it still fails to send M6 without knowing the C↔P session key and the private key of . In re-authentication protocol-1 and protocol-2, if ( ) impersonates and successfully intercepts all the messages from , without knowing the C↔P session key, ( ) fails to send a valid M3 in protocol-1 and an authentic M5 in protocol-2. The failure of M3/M5 indicates the presence of a malicious user. Likewise, in mutual authentication protocol for customers, an intruder cannot acquire partial keys without knowing the C ↔ P session keys.
B. Impersonating
Let us consider an intruder ( ) who can intercept and record messages from and can communicate with . If ( ) impersonates and successfully intercepts all messages from , it brings a minor delay, and initiates another authentication process. Moreover, ( ) is unable to obtain without knowing the private key of and cannot obtain without knowing the private key of . Similarly, in re-authentication protocol-1 and protocol-2, if ( ) impersonates and successfully intercepts all messages from , ( ) is still unable to obtain without knowing the C↔P session key.
C. Replay or Multiplicity Attack
To investigate the strength of TAP against a replay or multiplicity attack, as introduce the intruder ( ) , as discussed above, and launch a replay attack against initial and reauthentication protocols.
a) Replay attack on the Initial Authentication Protocol
In the {Z( ), }∆ case, the intruder ( ) can replay a few messages in the initial authentication protocol run; however, it fails to complete the protocol run, and the presence of the intruder is detected after few messages are exchanged. 
b) Replay attack on Re-Authentication Protocol-1
In the case of { ′ , }∆ , the intruder ( ) can replay a few messages in re-authentication protocol-1; however, it fails to complete the protocol run and the presence of the intruder is thus detected after a few messages are exchanged. 
c) Replay attack in Re-Authentication Protocol-2 In the case of {Z( ), }∆
, the attack follows a message sequence similar to that of the initial authentication case and provides the same conclusion; at M3, detects the threat, and at M5 the corresponding identifies the intruder. However, if { }∆ and Z( )∆ such that { , } ∈ , meaning that the intruder intercepts the messages and uses it to become authenticated by another by exploiting the fact that the do not interact throughout the procedure. This attack is carried out as follows: which it receives from its partner, who runs a parallel session with a legitimate counterpart. However, even under the given conditions, the intruder cannot re-authenticate. The attack on the initial authentication will proceed as follows: Figure 10 . An example of a successful attack on TAP under given conditions.
E. Remarks on TAP security
In TAP, if a legitimate counter entity is an active participant in the system, the impersonating or is detectable and identifiable; this implies that replay, binding, and parallel session attacks are not successful attacks against TAP. However, under highly exceptional conditions, a man in the middle, who can replay the messages and run a parallel session of the protocol with the capability of a binding attack, can launch a successful attack. In a system where these conditions are likely to occur, it is recommended to take certain measures to authenticate the identity of the broadcasting service provider entity ( ). To prevent DDoS attacks, the group join and initial authentication procedures include a puzzle in M1 and proceed if the requesting entity provides a valid solution [18, 19] .
VII.
Formal analysis of TAP using CSP and RANK function analysis Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) refer a form of algebra which describes and analyzes a system which consists of communicating processes [20] . TAP authentication procedures can be defined as events of CSP processes, and through the rank function analysis method [21] [22] [23] , we can verify the security of TAP.
CSP Notations:
• → : Process performs an event on its interface. After performing event process may or may not change its state.
Choice is a choice operator, it provides a process who behaves as or .
• | | : and run in parallel and synchronized on event .
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-||| = |<>| .
• ⊢ : Set of messages can generate message . • ( ): All possible event traces of process .
-∈ ( ): A trace sequence belongs to ( ) if performs events of in the same sequence.
• ⇓ : The set of messages in trace sequence collected at channel .
• ⨡ : Maximal subsequence of trace sequence who's elements are taken from event set .
-If the trace is one of the traces of process such that trace predicated by the event/message , implies that process satisfies the event/message set . Such statement is trace specification (TS).
• : Set of id's of all and .
• ≈ : n is sufficient information to trust that m is correct/true information.
A. Modeling the TAP network in CSP We consider the system , which is defined by the legitimate user processes of TAP in conjunction with the intruder process .
, and represent the legitimate interleaving processes of , and , respectively, which are running in parallel and which are synchronized to intruder at the [ , ] event set. This gives the intruder the capabilities discussed below. a) Modeling Intruder in CSP Let us define a CSP model for intruder process as discussed in an earlier study [17] with certain extra capabilities. The intruder is capable of controlling all communication channels (send and receive) and can redirect, spoof, replay or block messages. It also has the initially known information , e.g., the IDs of all users. When a legitimate user sends a message to another legitimate user, can intercept and record each message; these intercepted messages are additional information with regard to the current information ( ) of i-e ∪ { }.
Let us also suppose the existence of legitimate users and . Intruder can deceive by
sending a message , intercepted or generated from current information ( ⊢ ), and pretending to be user .
b) Modeling TAP Authentication Procedures in CSP
The activities of , and in TAP can be defined as CSP processes. In addition to the activation of TAP authentication, the CSP processes also generate two signals, and ℎ:
 . . . ≈ : Based upon information n, participant A is confident that shared information m is trusted information between A and B.  ℎ. . . : B authenticates A based upon trusted information m and B agrees that A was previously running the protocol and performed the corresponding signal . The CSP processes for the TAP initial authentication protocol:
The CSP processes for TAP re-authentication protocol-1:
The CSP processes for TAP re-authentication protocol-2:
Where the activities of are common for all of the TAP protocols.
B. Rank Function Analysis
To prove the overall security of TAP, we use a proof strategy which verifies that all authentication protocols satisfy the rank theorem, which implies that TAP is a secure protocol. The entire process is discussed in detail in subsequent sub-sections. a) Proof strategy According to the protocol semantics, the signal . . . must follow a signal ℎ. . . , which implies the following authentication property (AP1):
. . . 
To prove that should meet AP1, Schneider [22] specifies a simple strategy: for to satisfy AP1, must establish that ℎ. . 1 cannot be generated in if an occurrence of . . . 0 ≈ 1 is prevented. This proof strategy implies the following trace specification (TS1):
) maps the messages to a number, where is the set of all messages and signal generated messages ( ⊢ ) appearing in the protocol run. ( ) > 0 if the disclosure of is safe (i.e., if maintains a secure state) and ( ) ≤ 0 if the disclosure of is unsafe (i.e., if enters a compromising state). For a process to maintain a positive , it should not transmit ( ) ≤ 0 until and unless has already received ( ) ≤ 0 . Such a process maintains the following trace specification (TS2).
⇔ ∀ ∈ ( ) ∘ ( ⇓ ) > 0 ⇒ ( ⇓ ) > 0 If a process maintains TS2, it never introduces ( ) ≤ 0; hence, a protocol is proved to be secure if all processes maintain TS2.
c) Rank Theorem and Sufficient Condition Rank Theorem:
If, for event sets and , satisfying P1) ∀ ∈ ∘ ( ) > 0
then, . The proof of theorem is presented in earlier work [20] . The four properties of the rank function prevent an exchange of non-positive messages in the system | | , which is synchronized with upon event set . In TAP, = . . . and = ℎ. . . , which implies that the occurrence of signal will stop the process . Earlier, we discussed with regard to the proof strategy that TAP is secure if it satisfies TS1. If the rank function of TAP holds all properties of the rank theorem, this implies that all of the processes maintain TS2, and satisfies TS1. This condition is sufficient to prove that TAP is a secure authentication protocol.
d) Rank Analysis for TAP initial Authentication Here, we define the rank function for the initial authentication. As discussed earlier, if an intruder impersonates or , the system maintains a secure state; hence, ( ) > 0. All nonce instances are non-positive such that ( ) ≤ 0 ; hence, the nonce must be sent out encrypted with a secure key ( represents the set of all secure keys); i.e., ( ( )) > 0. As described in TS1, is restricted upon . . . , and any message or signal after the signal is marked as non-positive. Hence, the protocol maintains a positive under the given restriction, and it satisfies P4. It is concluded that the TAP initial authentication protocol is secure, and we further check reauthentication protocol-1 and protocol-2. e) Rank Analysis for TAP Re-Authentication Rank function for TAP re-authentication protocols 1 and 2 are similar to the rank function for initial authentication (because all the conventions of initial authentication hold true for reauthentication protocol 1 and 2), except ticket, which is encrypted with non-positive keys, hence we have ( ) >0. From CSP of TAP re-authentication, we notice that message and signal pattern after . . . is similar to the initial authentication protocol. Hence, TAP satisfies the rank properties for re-authentication protocol 1 and 2 as well. It concludes that TAP is a secure authentication protocol. 
VIII. Security and Performance Comparison

A. Security Comparison
In this section, we compare TAP with existing authentication schemes [24] [25] [26] [27] . The TAP protocol is not limited to a particular network type or application scenario; thus, we compare TAP with a sensor network [24] [25] , LTE [26] and client-server applications [27] . In the previous sections, we examined the strength of TAP with a rigorous analysis. For further confirmation of the strength of the TAP protocol, we implemented TAP and several well-known previously proposed schemes [24] [25] [26] [27] in an automated security protocol analysis tool, Scyther [28] . The Scyther tool verifies protocol claims against possible attacks in the presence of an intruder, as discussed in Section V-B. The claims are events which describe the aim and security properties of the authentication protocol, as defined below [1] [2] . Aliveness: This claim infers that at the end of a protocol run, the participants are guaranteed that all participants were running the protocol. Weak Agreement: This claim presumes that at the end of the protocol run, protocol initiator is confident that the protocol responder has been running the protocol, though superficially. Non-injective Agreement: This claim infers that at the end of a protocol run, the protocol initiator is confident that the protocol responder has been running the Restricted U GW S U GW S U GW S U GW S UE MME HSS UE MME HSS U S U S C P ME C P ME protocol according to a defined role and participants are agreed upon a data set shared during the protocol run. Non-injective Synchronization: This claim infers that at the end of a protocol run, all participants are confident that all other participants exactly followed their roles in the protocol and exchanged messages in the intended order. In Scyther the protocols are modeled as an exchange of messages among the participants performing specific 'roles'; for instance, the customer node performs the role of the initiator, the service provider performs the role of the responder, and the ME performs the role of a server. We implemented and tested TAP and the proposed methods of Vaiyda et al. [24] , Chang et al. [25] , Xiehua [26] , and Lin et al. [27] through the claims mentioned above with the parameter settings given in Table I .
The protocols are tested under 'Restricted' and 'Not Restricted' conditions. Under the 'Restricted' conditions, honest participants using the protocol are restricted and can thus run only one instance of the protocol. These results are shown in Table II . It is clear that our protocol qualifies all of the protocol claims, and no attacks were noted under the restricted condition. Conversely, it fails to fulfill a few claims when participants are permitted to run multiple instances. However, our protocol outperforms those in the earlier works [24] [25] [26] [27] , and it is secure in a large number of systems and scenarios. In contrast, the earlier methods [24] [25] [26] [27] are susceptible to several attacks and fail to fulfill the majority of authentication claims.
B. Performance Comparison
The results of the performance comparison are presented in Table  III , where we compare the efficiency of the TAP authentication protocol suite in terms of the computational cost, message complexity and time synchronization requirements against the authentication schemes discussed above [24] [25] [26] [27] . The computational cost is estimated to be the sum of the overall number of modular exponentiations (e) and the hash (h) and XOR (x) operations. To compute the computational cost of one of the earlier methods [26] , we assumed that the cost of functions f3, f4, and s10 in the SE-EPS vector generation algorithm were identical to one hash operation. Regarding the computational cost, the TAP protocol suite greatly outperforms all of the schemes. Referring to the modular exponentiation, the approach presented by Lin et al. [27] is the most expensive scheme, followed by those of Chang et al. [25] , Xiehua [26] and Vaiyda et al. [24] . For the sake of simplicity, we ignore the computational cost of the XOR operation. Figure 11 shows the computational cost of TAP compared to the approaches of Vaiyda et al. [24] , Chang et al. [25] and Xiehua [26] for a mobile customer node moving across the network and experiencing the authentication process. Figure 12 shows the message complexity of TAP compared to these earlier schemes [24] [25] [26] [27] for a mobile customer node moving across the network and experiencing the authentication process multiple times. The message complexity is presented for the method of Vaiyda et al. [24] , calculated with the assumption that k=3, meaning that at the time of joining there are five potential nodes which can process the login request sent by a user. In the bestcase scenario, when a customer experiences re-authentication protocol 1 the, TAP message complexity is the lowest. However, the message complexity of the approach by Lin et al. [27] is slightly better than the message complexity of TAP in the worst-case scenario. Moreover, unlike the methods of Vaiyda et al. [24] , Chang et al. [25] and Lin et al. [27] , TAP and the approach by Xiehua [26] do not require time synchronization among the participating entities.
IX. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a novel key distribution and authentication protocol (TAP) for dynamic and mobile network applications. TAP enhances the level of protocol security with the assistance of time-based encryption keys and scales down the authentication complexity by issuing an authentication ticket. A security analysis conducted here shows that TAP is secure against known attacks. A formal analysis using CSP and rank function analysis further confirms the strength of the TAP protocol. We also compared the security and performance of TAP with a sensor network [24] [25] , LTE [26] and with the Client Server Application approach [27] . The final results show that TAP is secure and desirable for an immense range of network applications.
